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ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Where the grantors of the plaintiffs in ejectment occupied,
cleared, fenced and cultivated land for over ten years (the statutory period in Washington), which land was subRailroad,
Right of Way ject to a railroad right of way, such occupation,
the Supreme Court of Washington holds, was not adverse,
but permissive, since it was not, in the view of that court,
inconsistent with such right of way. Hence the railroad's
easement was not extinguished by the plaintiff's possession:
Northern Counties Av. Trust v. Enyard,64 Pac. 516.
In Jordanv. Riley, 6o N. E. 7, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts holds that occupants of a strip of land holding adversely to the owner, have full title where
Occupancy
by Mlstake the owner was continuously disseised for twenty
years, though they claimed such strip only because mistaken
as to the location of the boundary line according to the deeds.
AGENCY.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in Aational Citizens' Bank v. Ertz, 85 N. W. 821, that where an agreement is
entered into between a mortgagor of chattels and
Mortgagor
of
the mortgagee, that the former may sell the propChattels
erty for the purpose of applying the proceeds in
payment of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor is constituted
the agent of the mortgagee; and if, in a proper case, he represents or warrants the quality or condition of the property sold,
the mortgagee is bound by such representations and warranty.
BANKRUPTCY.

In Citicago Title and Trust Co. v. Roebling, 107 Fed. 7 , the
United States Circuit Court (N. D. Ills.), holds that where a
Preference of bankrupt's property before insolvency consists
Judgment chiefly of a manufacturing plant and raw materials

Creditor
for use therein, the fair valuation of which depends
largely upon the fact that the plant is a going concern, and
such valuation as a going concern brings the entire fair value
47'
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of the bankrupt's assets to a total in excess of his liabilities,
the fact that a judgment creditor caused a levy to be made on
such plant, and a sale under such levy, thus destroying the
value of the plant as a going concern and bringing the total
value of his assets to a figure below his liabilities, does not
create a preference in favor of the judgment creditor which
could be recovered by the bankrupt's trustee, though the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that such levy and sale
would cause the insolvency. For though the subsequent
bankrupt gave the judgment note upon which judgment was
entered, he was not insolvent at the time he gave it, but was
only rendered so by the execution issued thereon. The court
reaches the conclusion reluctantly, but proceeds on the ground
that the act provides that a bankrupt shall be deemed to have
given a preference if, "being insolvent," he procures or suffers
judgment against himself.
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange rules provide that any
member wishing to sell his membership shall have the right
Asts,
to do so provided he has no unsettled contracts
scat in Stock with, or claims against, him by any member of the
Exchange
stock exchange, etc., subject, however, to the
approval of the proper authorities of the exchange. In In re
Page, 107 Fed. 89, the Circuit Court of Appeals holds that a
seat in the stock exchange under the conditions set out in the
rule is a valuable right, and that the right to transfer it passes
to the member's trustee in bankruptcy, who is entitled to sell
the same as part of the bankrupt's assets.
BANKS.

In Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank of Marion, 64
Pac. 634, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds that where a
collectlons,

check is sent to a bank for collection and such

bank, after collection, retains and uses the proceeds of the check in its general business, it will
be deemed to be an agent and trustee of the owner of the
check, and the money so wrongfully retained and used will be
deemed to be a trust fund, which the owner may follow and
reclaim if it can be identified, provided the rights of no innocent third parties have intervened. Further, it is held that
the plan of exchanging checks and making a settlement of the
day's business, such as was adopted by the banks in the present case, is not to be regarded as a mere payment of indebtedness, but as a collection of the amount of the check, the same
as though cash had been received.
Trust Fund,
Payment
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BILLS AND NOTES.

A. signed a promissory note in the name of another by himself as attorney in fact, but he, to the knowledge of the payee
and a subsequent indorsee, had no authority to use
Liability,
that other's name; and he had refused, at their
Attorney
in Pact
request, to sign his.owix name and, bfid himself
personally. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court of
Kansas holds that he is not liable upon the note personally,
notwithstanding the fact that it was given in a transaction of
his own and that he was generally using the name signed to
the note as a trade name: Kansas National Bank v. Bay, 64
Pac. 596. The case is regarded by the court as one of first
impression: "No cases precisely in point have been cited to
us, nor in considerable research ourselves among the authorities have we been able to find one entirely similar in its
facts."
In Brey v. Hagan,62 S. W. I, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided that a surety in a note is not released by the
addition of the name of another surety without his
Alteration,
Signing by consent before the delivery of the note to the
payee. The reasons assigned are that the addition
Additional
Surety
of another surety does not increase the liability of
the first one, and the principal in such obligation may be presumed to have had implied authority from such first security
to secure another.
It not infrequently happens that courts depart from a rule
of law requiring delivery, consent, etc., by a doctrine that the
facts in the case will be regarded as showing conDeniver3
structive delivery or consent, etc. This appears
in the case of Rowan v. Clenonetli, 38 S. E. 544, where the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia first admits that
delivery of a promissory note is indispensable to its efficacy,
and if not delivered in the lifetime of its maker it cannot be
delivered after his death, and then says that this delivery may
be actual or constructive, and if it is clear that the maker of
the note intended it to be a finished note and binding on him,
without further act on his part, it will so operate, though not
actually delivered in his lifetime. In this case the notes were
to pay children a debt owed them by their father out of their
deceased mother's estate. The court regards the fact of their
living in the same house with him, and his being a proper custodian of such notes, as important grounds for dispensing with
actual delivery. The holding of the court is no doubt in line
with abstract justice, but it is undoubtedly a straining of legal
rules, as the decision indirectly admits.
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BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Williamson
v. Eastern Building and Loan Association, 38 S. E. 616, that
Representa- representations made by a building and loan assotions, Matu- ciation in its advertising literature and certificates of
rity of Stock stock, that stock matured in a certain number of
payments, and that the holder would then be entitled to payment of the face value of such shares, are not representations
of a future fact or probability, but that estoppel may be predicated thereon.

CARRIRS.

The Appellate Court of Indiana holds in Cleveland C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinsley, 6o N. E. 169. that a passenger who is wrongfully denied admission to the
train may recover for humiliation, though he
yields to such denial without requiring the exercise of force
by the employes of the railroad.
Damages
for NonAdmission

'CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Flaccus v.
Smit,, 48 Atl. 894, that where an employer adopts a system
Inducement in his business of employing only non-union workto Break
men, and of stipulating in his contracts with them
that they shall join no union, the court will enjoin interference
therewith by outsiders, enticing and endeavoring to entice
them to join a union, when it appears that such interference is
injurious to the employer, and if allowed to continue will ruin
his business.
Three responsible contractors, without fraud or collusion,
submitted bids to make an improvement for the same sum of
Equal Bids by money, and after the opening of the bids agreed
contractors, among themselves that each should submit a
Collusion
written proposition to pay a certain sum to each
of the others and secure the contract, and whichever offered
the most should have it. Under these circumstances the
Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Conway v. Garden City
Paving and Post Co., 6o N. E. 82, that the agreement is contrary to public policy and void, and that the amount which
the party receiving the contract agreed to pay the others could
not be recovered by them. The basis of the decision is that
the agreement presents an effort to stifle competition.
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CORPORATIONS.
A trial court, on appointing a receiver for the defendant, an
insolvent corporation, enjoined all creditors from further prosInsolvency, ecuting pending suits, but on application modified
Modification the decree by allowing a bank to prpseute a
of Decree
pending action to final judgmeat without prejudice. On these facts the Supreme Court of South Carolina
holds in First NationalBank of Ctarlotte v. Iredell Land Co.,
that the bank was entitled, under the order, to have the judgment so obtained declared a first lien on the defendant's land,
though the judgment was not obtained until after the appointment of the receiver. One judge dissents on the general
principle that the order appointing a receiver of the property
of the insolvent corporation operated to place the property in
the custody of the court, and no judgment thereafter rendered
could acquire any lien or priority over said property. He
regards the modification of the decree insufficient to overturn
this general principle, herein differing from the majority of the
court.
In Nowack v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 6o N. E. 32,
the Court of Appeals of New York holds, against the dissent
Admisslons,

of three judges, that where an investigator is

employed by a corporation "to see the witnesses
and take statements and to interview witnesses,"those who "expect and those who are witnesses,"-on the trial
of actions against it, he is the agent of the corporation in
whatever he does in relation to that part of the corporate business; and if he attempts to bribe witnesses to testify falsely in
favor of the corporation evidence of such act is admissible
against the corporation, though there is no proof that it
expressly authorized the act. The dissent proceeds on the
ground that the attempt by the investigator did harm to no
one, and the principal is only liable where harm is done, when
an implied authorization is relied on.
Attempt to
Bribe

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In a shortper curiam opinion the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Feild v. Robinson, 48 Atl. 873, that the act
vaccination, requiring that admission to schools be refused
Admission to except on a certificate that the child has been vac,PublicSchool cinated or has had smallpox, is constitutional.
School directors, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may
exclude from the public schools pupils who have not been
vaccinated, and "the courts will not say that such a resolution
[i. e., excluding such pupils] is an abuse of official discretion."
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (tontinued).

This practically allows the directors unlimited authority in
excluding pupils for this cause, since this language clearly
shows that such resolution will in no instance be regarded an
abuse of discretion.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania gives the governor "power
to disapprove of any item or items of any bill making approVeto power, priations of money embracing distinct items."
Partial

The Supreme Court of the State holds in Corn-

Veto
monwealth v. Barnett,47 Atl. 976, that under this
provision it is competent for the governor to veto in part an
appropriation of a lump sum for school purposes in a general
appropriation bill, that is he has power to diminish the amount
appropriated. Judge Mestrezat dissents.
In certifying their opinion to the House of Representatives
of Massachusetts the Supreme Judicial Court of that State
voting
holds that the constitutional provision that repreMachines

sentatives shall be chosen by a written vote does

not prohibit the use of voting machines, dispensing with the
use of a separate piece of paper for each vote, and registering
the successive votes, by successive punches by revolution of
cog-wheels or other similar device, the total number being
shown by an index: In re House Bill No. i291, 6o N. E. 129.

Three judges dissent.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In State v. Ellison, 38 S. E. 574, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia holds that, though the crime of an
Accessory

Before the

accessory before the fact is inchoate in the act of
counseling, advising, aiding, etc., it is not consum-

Fact
mated until the deed is actually done, and that it
is for the deed the result of the counseling or procuring, and
not for the counseling or procuring itself, that the accessory is
indicted. It follows trom this that the locus in quo of the
offence of an accessory before the fact to a felony is the county
in which the felony is done, and the offence is properly, in the
absence of statute, triable in that county.
The old rule as to the presumption that the wife committing
a crime in the presence of her husband is presumed to act
Crime by wife under his compulsion in the absence of evidence to

in Husband's the contrary, is applied to a somewhat singular
Presence
case in State v. Miller, 62 S. W. 692. There a

wife, whose husband was imprisoned after conviction for murder, at his instigation procured a revolver, which she carried

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CRIMINAL I.AW (Continued).

and delivered to him at the jail. The Supreme Court of Missouri holds that such crime was committed in the husband's
presence, though he was not present when she procured and
conveyed the revolver to the jail. She was therefore relieved
from liability, the court regarding the evidence irr.te case
insufficient to go to the jury to overthrow the legal presumption.
DIVORC9.

In Fisher v. Fisher,48 Atl. 833, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland holds that where a wife had condoned the adultery
Condonation,

of her husband his subsequent cruelty to her,

though not in itself sufficient cause for divorce,
nullified the effect of the condonation and rendered the original act of adultery good cause for divorce. Condonation, the
court holds, is upon the implied condition not only that there
be no renewal of the act which is condoned, but also upon condition that there be no conduct of any such kind as would
furnish cause for divorce, So, just as it is not necessaiy that
where improper relations are shown, it appears that they went
as far as adultery, it is here held that it is not necessary that
these acts of cruelty be sufficiently serious to ground an action
for divorce, though not sufficient for this they nullify the former
condonation.
Recrimination

EVIDENCE,

In a trial for murder a stenographer who took the testimony
on a former trial was sworn for the purpose of impeaching
Stenogra- witnesses, but could not recollect what their testipier's Notes

mony on the former trial was. He was willing to

swear that he took the testimony correctly and that his notes
showed exactly what the witness testified. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas holds, in String/ellow v. State, 6i
S. W. 719, that such notes are admissible in evidence to
contradict the witnesses, One judge dissents on the ground
that the cases have not gone further than allowing a witness to
refresh his memory from such notes.
FRAUD.

In Dean v. Ross, 6o N. E. I19, the facts showed that the
plaintiff in the case, after the death of her first husband, had
Concealment, consulted a spiritualistic medium, and had transSpiritualism ferred to the medium certain property by the
alleged direction of the spirit of her deceased husband. "Her
eyes," says the court (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
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FRAUD (Continued).

setts), "seem to have been opened at or about the time she
was married to her second husband," but this was more than
six years after the transfer of the property. The court holds,
however, that there was such a concealment as to allow the
action more than six years after the transfer, when the plaintiff
did not discover the deception until within six years of the
effort to recover the property. The defendant contended that
either no one could say that spirits do not speak through
mediums or else the deception was so obvious that the plaintiff could not rely on it. The court meets this dilemma by
refusing to sustain the second contention, and by claiming
that the first very interesting point is not raised by the pleadings. No doubt a discussion of this occult question by the
Massachusetts court would be very interesting.
HUSBAND AND WIlE.

In Brewer v. Bowersox, 48 AtI. io6o, it appeared that A.
had made a deposit in a certain bank, which he subsequently
Joint Bank changed to the joint account of himself and his
wife, so that either could draw it on indorsing the
Deposit
certificates. Subsequently, during A.'s life, his wife indorsed
the certificates to another bank for collection, and took a certificate of deposit reading, "R eceived of A. and B. [A.'s wife]
$1,98i, which sum will be paid to them on their order." The
husband subsequently died, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland holds that the certificate created an estate by the entirety,
and hence on the death of the husband the wife was entitled
to the whole amount by survivorship.
INSURANCE.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in

Whiting v. Burkhart, 6o N. E. i, that a provision in a fire
policy that it shall be void if assigned without the
consent of the insurer, does not apply to the
Assignment assignment of the interest of a mortgagee, to
whom the policy is made payable as his interest may appear.
What is effected by the assignor by assigning his right and
interest in the policy, says the court, is "not to transfer the
policy, but to assign to another his right to receive the proceeds,
if any, under it." This, it is held, is not opposed to the reason
for requiring the stipulation against assignment, which is
intended to protect the company from having thrust upon it
an insured whose character would make the so-called "moral
risk" greater.
Provision
Against
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INTERNAL REVBNU.

The recent case of American Express Co. v. Michigan, 177
U. S. 404, deciding that the express company could increase
War Tax,
its rates by the amount of tax required on its
Express
receipts, is generally known. The People v. Wells,
Companies Fargo & Co., 64 Pac. 76- the Su-rtiie
imit- of
California attempts to distinguish that case, and refuses to
apply it where the facts, in the view of the court, show that
the express company did not increase their rates, but sought
to collect the amount of the tax, not as a part of the rate, but
as tax. So they hold that where a package is offered to an
express company for transportation, accompanied by a tender
of the full amount of the company's regular charges for
the service, such company could' no. refusetf6, accept the
package unless further payment of one cent or of a one-cent
documentary internal revenue stamp was made, and mandamus
would lie to compel its acceptance. Two judges dissent
regarding the case as controlled by American Express Company v. Michigan, and the distinction attempted as not substantial.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

A distress for rent may lawfully be made after the death of
the tenant, provided the term continues, and the tenant has
Distress After appointed an executor, or administration has been
Death
granted upon his estate: Brown v. Howell, 48 At.
of Tenant
1020. But the Supreme Court of New Jersey further holds in that case that if a distress be made after tenant
has died intestate, even before administration granted the
administrator subsequently appointed, whose title runs back
by relation to the death of the intestate, cannot treat as a test
a distraint which would have been lawful if he had actually
been administrator.
The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee holds in
Forbusv. Watkins, 62 S. W. 36, that where a lessee for a term
Improvements, of years, under an oral contract requiring him to
voluntary

construct a building on the property, but author-

izing him to remain on the premises and retain
the land without paying rent till the rent at an agreed rate
shall equal the value of the building, voluntarily abandons the
property he cannot recover the value of such building. But,
on the other hand, he is entitled to set off the improvements
against the landlord's claim for use and occupation. One judge
dissents, assigning, however, no reasons.
Abandonment
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LANDLORD AND TENANT (Continued).

In Vdilage of Penankee v. Wisconsin Lakes Ice & Cartage
Co., 85 N. W. 66o, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds
erections by that where the defendant has leased premises for a
Sublessee
term of years, and his lessee began the erection of
buildings thereon, the defendant cannot be enjoined from
erecting such buildings, since he has no power to direct or
control his lessee's occupation or control of the premises.
EG=IGEN.

.

A., an employe of B., was holding a horse while B. applied
some medicine to its neck. The horse jumped, whereupon B.
Unlawful Act, began beating it with a heavy stick with a nail
Intervening drawn through it, and, by reason of B.'s foot slipCause
ping, he unintentionally hit A. on the nose, causing injury. A. sues B., and the Supreme Court of Iowa holds
in Osborne v. Van Dyke, 85 N. W. 784, that on instruction the
defendant would not be liable if in beating the horse he exercised reasonable care to avoid striking A., and the blow which
inflicted the injury was caused by an accidental slip, was erroneous, since the slipping of defendant's foot, being the consequence of his own wrongful act, was not an excuse for the
injury. Cases were cited in behalf of the defendant where the
act which resulted in injury Le. g., running a train] was unlawful
because done on Sunday. These are distinguished on the
ground that the wrongful act was a condition, not a cause, of
the ultimate injury.
In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Arnold, 29 Southern, 768, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that where a path across
Injury to
a railroad company's lot was used indiscriminately
Licensee
by all the citizens of a town, but without any
inducement held out by such company for them to use it, one
going along such path for her own convenience was a licensee
and could not recover for injury sustained through the negligence of a servant of the railroad company which did not
amount to a wilful or wanton wrong. The court says: " A
master is not responsible to a servant for the negligence of a
fellow servant; a fortiori, he is not responsible to a stranger
for such negligence. But the ground of the fellow servant
rule is frequently said to be that the risks of employment,
including the negligence of fellow servants, are included and
contemplated in the terms of the hiring, and this language of
the court implies a doubt of this as the proper ground of that
rule.

PROGRESS OF THE LAM.

NUISANCE.

In Northwood v. BarberAsphalt Pay. Co., 85 N. W. 724, it
appeared that the defendant was found guilty and was enjoined
Abatement, from committing a nuisance, which consisted in
fumes, gases, dust, etc., injurious to the inhabitants
Decree of
in the neighborhood. Under Ahe diecree it iwa-s
Court
commanded to do certain things for the purpose of -pfeventing the nuisance. The decree also contained a general clause
forbidding the maintenance of the nuisance. One of the
complainants instituted proceedings for contempt, claiming
that the nuisance had not been abated, but was in fact, worse
than before. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court
of Michigan holds that it was the duty of the defendant, if
the methods provided for in the decree .failed to -abate the
nuisance, to either try other means or apply to the court for
leave to do so, or close its works; and further, that the
defendant could not relieve itself from liability for contempt
of court by showing that it had adopted the methods provided
in the decree.

PHYSICIANS.

In Hurley v. Eddingfield,59 N. E. Io58, the Supreme Court
of Indiana holds that a physician duly licensed to practice is
not liable for arbitrarily refusing to respond to a
Failure to
Answer Call call, though he is the only physician available.
The court regards the analogies attempted to be made by
counsel, to innkeepers, common carriers, and the like, as not
here applicable.

RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds in White
v. New York P. & N. R. Co., 38 S. E. i8o, that where in an
Sparksfrom action against a railroad for damages for a fire
Locomotives, claimed to have been caused by sparks emitted
from the defendant's locomotive, it is shown that
Due Care
the fire was started by sparks, the defendant has the burden
of proving that it has availed itself of the best contrivances to
prevent the escape of sparks, but on the other hand, though
the fire was shown to have so originated, there could be no
recovery, since it appeared that the railroad had employed the
most approved appliances in proper repair. This the court
regarded conclusive evidence of due care, and hence that there
was no basis for recovery.
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SHERIFF.

A sheriff having an execution in his hands was notified by
the attorney of the judgment debtors that the execution was
void, and not to levy, and such debtors executed
Execution,
a bond to indemnify the sheriff against loss or
Bond of
damage for failure to levy. The validity of the
Indemnity
execution depended on a new statute, which had not been construed by the court, and the sheriff was in honest doubt as to
his right to levy. Under these circumstances the Supreme
Court of Michigan holds in Ray v. McDevitt, 85 N. W. io86
(one judge dissenting), that taking the bond was not against
public policy, and, the sheriff's bondsmen having been compelled to pay the amount of the execution, their assignee may
recover on the bond of indemnity.

TAXATION.

The estate of an insolvent corporation assigned for the
benefit of creditors is subject to taxation in the hands of the
Propertyin

court's commissioner or receiver until there has

of been an order of distribution fixing the amount to
Receiver which each claimant is entitled, though the claimants be non-residents: Youtsey v. Commonwealtiz, 62 S.W. 262
(Kentucky). The court refuses to sustain the contention,
which it intimates has prevailed in other jurisdictions, that the
fund did not belong to the insolvent corporation, but to the
creditors, and that especially the part owed to non-resident
creditors is not subject to taxation in the hands of the receiver.
A case with similar facts, but dealing with a decedent's estate,
is regarded as analogous and is followed.
Hands

TELEGRAMS.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ragland, 6i S. W. 421
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that a stipulation
Stipulation in a telegram that the company shall not be liable
for mistake unless the message is telegraphed
against
back for comparison does not relieve the company
Liability,
Repeating from liability for a mistake occurring through
want of reasonable care in repeating the message at a relay
station. Such lack of reasonable care, the court held, might
have been inferred in this case apart from the mere failure to
repeat; such lack of care, however, it seems, does not arise
from such failure to repeat.
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TRUSTS.

The benevolent attitude of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania toward spendthrift trusts is well known. Incidentally
Spendthrift illustrating this we note the case of In re Moord's
Trusts,
Estate, 48 Atl. 884, where that court holds that
flerger
where the testator hg -dafdd sffidtlfrhfh tu-r in
life estates for his sons, there is no merger affedfig them by
reason of the sons' taking an absolute estate in the remainder,
because of the gift thereof to charity failing through the death
of the testator within a month of the making of the will.
Under a testamentary trust the income of the trust fund was
to be applied to the support of the beneficiary, who was in
Application the habit of occasionally indulging in alcoholic
of Income excesses, at which time a physician rendered services to him, with the knowledge of one of the trustees. The
beneficiary had become insolvent, and it did not appear that
the trustees had furnished him with all that was necessary
with respect to medical attendance, Under these circumstances the Court of Appeals of New York holds, in Sherman
v. Skuse, 59 N. E. 99 o , that a claim for such services rendered
on the request of the beneficiary could be enforced in equity
as against the trustees.
WILT'S.
In Louisiana it seems the rules still survive as to the presumption of prior death in case two persons perish in the same
catastrophe under circumstances which render it
Implied
Condition
impossible to decide actually which died first, In
Succession of Longles, 29 Southern, 739, the Supreme Court of
that state holds that these apply where mother and daughter
perished in a shipwreck, and where each had made a will in
favor of the other. It was strenuously insisted that the legacies were on implied conditions that they should not take
effect in case of such an event, since it was argued such could
not have been the intention of either testatrix. But the court
refuses to read such condition into the will and distributes the
estate, giving fullIeffect to the presumptions as to prior death
dependent on age, sex, etc.
The Court of Appeals in New York holds in Connelly v.
O'Brienz, 6o N. E. 20, that where a will provided that testator's
vesting of entire estate should go to his widow during her life,
Legacies
"and then to such of my children as may then be
alive, share and share alike," the remainder to the children
vests at the death of the testator and only the enjoyment is
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WILLS (Continued).

postponed. The court admits that the question is doubtful,
but regards the decision reached as supporting the intention
of the testator.
The Pennsylvania rule that a will must make a substantial
provision for an after-born child, or in default of such provision
the testator must be regarded as having died intesAfter-born
tate as to that child, seems well settled. As a
Child
development of the law in connection with this subject we find
the case of Owens v. Haines,48 Atl. 859, deciding that the
birth of a child after the execution of a will does not revoke
the will or afford any reason against its probate, and that
therefore it is immaterial that a child, claiming property under
such circumstances, failed to institute action until after the
expiration of the time limited for appeal from the probate.
It seems settled in Tennessee that the right of a widow to
dissent from her husband's will is under ordinary circumstances, personal to herself. This possibly is a
Dissentof
rule without exception, for in the case of WilliamWidow,
son v. Nelson, 62 S. W. 53, the Court of Chancery
Insanity
Appeals of that state holds that after her death her administrator has no right to dissent from her husband's will, though
he shows it would be for the benefit of her estate, and, in particular, though it appear that she was insane at all times after
her husband's death. Whether the committee of the insane
wife might have dissented is not decided, it not being in issue
in the case, but under the view taken by the court it is unlikely
that a different decision could be reached under such circumstances.
Against the dissent of two judges, the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division (Fourth Department), holds that where the
Construction, testatrix gave all her property to her two grand,survivor-

children who were sisters, providing that in case

of the death of either of them without heir or heirs,
such one's share should go over to the survivor, and made no
provision for their mother to take in any event, on the death
of one of them after the testatrix, leaving her sister and mother
surviving, as her only heirs, the surviving sister took the
entire property: In re Cramer,69 N. Y. Supp. 299. The court
Heirs"

construes the word " heirs " as " issue," and in allowing

"survivor" to include survivorship after death, take into
consideration facts as to the testatrix's age, etc., appearing
dehors the will. This the dissenting judges regard as error.

